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 Conflict of Law: Jurisdiction of the Legislative Court

A Memorandum, by Dan Meador

This memorandum will serve as a public notice instrument with general application. All matters of law and fact presented herein are believed to be true and accurate. Failure of interested parties to correct or rebut any given matter of law or fact will be construed as confession of correctness, with the consequence of general application as presumed fact for legal purposes. The memorandum is constructed as a good faith effort to disclose applicability of certain law and authority of Oklahoma courts, particularly with respect to uniform laws known as adopted acts.

Background & Character of "Non-constitutional" Court

On February 2, 1995, a Declaration by Writ of Mandamus endorsed by people from eleven Oklahoma counties was filed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court demanding that Oklahoma's high court promulgate rules for State district courts to operate as judicial courts in the framework of common law. The basis for the mandamus is current operation of district courts in Oklahoma and the other States party to the Constitution for the United States of America presently operating under Code law promulgated as uniform laws under the notion that the several States are federal States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction rather than State republics subject only to authority delegated in Article I of the Constitution. In July 1996, justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined taking original jurisdiction and thereby effectively refused to act.

As lead counsel, I have constructed but as yet have not filed a brief consenting to the case being closed. Aside from the Supreme Court's memorandum order misrepresenting the purpose of the action, I agree that the mandamus was an improper forum. The lengthy memorandum filed to support demands in July 1995 was accurate with respect to analysis of current operation of Oklahoma's district courts as legislative or statutory courts, and it was also accurate in asserting that State district courts, in the framework of uniform acts, accommodate Civil Law in the lineage of British Feudal Law, Roman Civil Law, etc., with the State's first-level courts operating under summary or admiralty rules. The history and evolution of "Code Law" is detailed in the Maine Bar Association Centennial Report (1992), which acknowledges that current Code Law is premised on the British Judicial Act of 1873, thus confirming the Admiralty/Civil Law character of Code law.

In a special appearance via one of his assistants, Oklahoma Attorney General W. A. Drew Edmondson failed to address, and therefore confessed, the allegation that Oklahoma government as a whole is currently operating under the presumption that the State and its various political subdivisions, including counties, cities and towns, school district, etc., and the office of district attorney (see Rule 54, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), are operating under presumption of a federal character, and by way of the State's enforcement and court systems, are imposing procedural rather than substantive law. This law, as described at 12 O.S. § 2, is in derogation of, meaning it operates outside of, common law indigenous to the State. As Justice Marian P. Opala of the Oklahoma Supreme Court confirmed in a December 1994 letter, the statutory court operates in a legislative rather than judicial capacity, and the law the court imposes is described as non-constitutional - it operates outside constitutional bounds. Further research demonstrates that State district courts in Oklahoma, along with first-level courts in the rest of the States, whether identified as district, circuit or superior courts, currently have only two capacities: They operate as admiralty courts, which accommodate private international law, or as vice-admiralty or administrative law courts, presuming that all who go before them are officers, agents or employees of the United States or political subdivisions of the United States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction.

At the heart of the matter, and the quickest way to demonstrate how the several States are accommodating the de facto federal character, is through the nation's credit and monetary systems, perpetrated by way of federally chartered financial institutions.

The United States Constitution makes the following stipulations:

At Article II § 8.1, the Constitution provides, "The Congress shall have Power.." [§ 8.5] "To coin Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof..," and at § 10.1 stipulates, "No State shall … coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts..."

These provisions have never been amended or repealed, yet there is no gold and silver coin in common circulation, and courts of the several States routinely award and enforce judgments denominated in or described as "dollars" [$], premised on current mediums generated through federally chartered financial institutions and obligations of the United States.

It's impossible to have it both ways - either the several States are independent of United States jurisdiction except under Article I delegated powers, or they are federal territories under Congress' Article IV jurisdiction, thereby being on a par with Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, etc. If the former, they must operate within the constitutional framework; if the latter, they may accommodate whatever initiative Congress undertakes save those things specifically prohibited by the Constitution (see Julliard, 1884).

The money issue is easily resolved: The three key pieces of legislation which accommodate fractional reserve banking, etc., are the Federal Reserve Act, the Banking Act of 1933, and the Banking Act of 1935. These are listed at 12 USCS §§ 226, 227 & 228 (1995 edition, Lawyer's Cooperative CD-ROM). By referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, beginning on page 751 of the 1995 Index volume to the Code of Federal Regulations, it is found that these statutes are not listed, and therefore do not have implementing regulations that extend to the several States and the population at large. Both the Administrative Procedures Act, at 5 USC § 552(a), and the Federal Register Act, at 44 USC § 1501 et seq., require publication of regulations, delegations of authority, etc., in the Federal Register if they have general application to the several States and the population at large. If regulations are not published in the Federal Register, they have limited application, as described at 44 USCS § 1505(a) (1980 edition, USCS):

It will be found at 44 USC §§ 1507 and 1510 that publication in the Federal Register is prima facie evidence of original documents, and contents in the Code of Federal Regulations is due judicial notice in courts of the several States and the United States. Particulars for publication are set out at 1 CFR §§ 21.40 & 21.41, and authorization for the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is located at 1 CFR § 8.5.

The exemption for heads of Government departments and agencies is prescribed at 5 USCS § 301:

The United States Supreme Court has several times ruled on the mandate for regulations being published in the Federal Register before any given United States statute is applicable to the several States and the Population at large. One of the more definitive statements, relating to the Internal Revenue Code, was in California Bankers Ass'n. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974): The requirement to publish implementing regulations in the Federal Register before any given statute promulgated by Act of Congress has general application extends to all federal legislation. This conclusion is affirmed by application of the term, "Act of Congress" at Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: The underlying principle is the law of legislative jurisdiction: When enacting legislation affecting the several States and the population at large, Congress cannot exceed authority delegated by Article I of the Constitution, however, there are two other jurisdictions where Congress is reasonably unrestricted. Those spheres include, (1) federal territories under Congress' legislative jurisdiction outside the several States and on federal enclaves in the several States ceded to the United States for constitutional purposes, and (2) as pertains to operation of United States Government itself. Authority exercised in Congress' capacity as government for federal territories and as applies to operation of United States Government does not extend to the several States and the population at large. Where territorial authority is concerned, the loophole used to accommodate emergence of the United States as a self-interested, geographical entity is located at Article IV § 3.2: When President Andrew Jackson vetoed extension of the charter for the second bank of the United States (1836), he premised his decision on the fact that Article I of the Constitution does not delegate authority for Congress to establish a national bank or national banking system. The conclusion has never been challenged, and it wasn't until after the Civil War that much was heard about the United States Government getting back in the banking business. In fact, the United States Supreme Court held out against the United States printing paper money until the Julliard decision (1884), which reversed fields from just four years before. In his excellent rebuttal, Naval Academy founder George Bancroft pointed out that the Julliard decision was premised on the permissive view of Congress' authority in the geographical United States where under Article IV § 3.2 authority, this legislative body as government for exclusively United States territories has power to do anything not prohibited by the Constitution (A Plea for the Constitution of the United States: Wounded in the House of Its Guardians).

Research in several critical areas relating to various federal government programs, including federal taxing authority under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, has demonstrated that for the most part, the illusion of United States statutory authority is generally applicable to United States Government, without consideration of territorial application. For example, my public notice memorandum pertaining to the Internal Revenue Service and application of the Internal Revenue Code (published as Public Notice in June 20 & 27 and July 3, 1996 editions of The Journal Record, Oklahoma City), demonstrates that Subtitles A & C of the Internal Revenue Code (income, employment, unemployment and related taxes, deduction at source, etc.), applies only to United States Government agencies and officers, agents and employees of those agencies, as defined at §§ 3401(c) & (d) of the Code (Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large). The following demonstrates that federally chartered financial institutions are set up for the same people, with the statutes located in Title 12 of the United States Code, pertaining to banks and banking (1980 edition, USCS):

Definition of the term "State" is particularly important as use of the term in the United States Code and State codes clearly demonstrates fraud engaged at both levels. Again, Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides clarification: Approximately the same definition appears in the Buck Act at 4 USCS § 110(d): These definitions of "State", consistent with the general application definition in the Internal Revenue Code, are exclusive of the several States, meaning the States party to the Constitution. As will be demonstrated, uniform laws adopted by legislatures of the several States presume that the States are federal States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction, on a par with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, rather than being State republics subject only to Congress' Article I delegated authority. This is the fraud accommodated by first-level courts of the several States, and has been the means by which State and United States governments have made an end run around common law indigenous to the States and have for all practical purposes aborted constitutional rule at State and local levels. However, there are a number of barriers to Governments of the several States abandoning state and national constitutions. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court addressed two of the more significant in New York v. United States, et al, 505 U.S. ___, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 112 S.Ct. 2408: In the Constitution for the United States of America, the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Tenth Amendment provide absolute barriers that preclude (1) Congress assuming power in the several States which is not specifically delegated by the Constitution, and (2) prevent officers of the several States from accommodating a federal power which is not delegated without first securing a constitutional amendment.

The nation's high court reiterated principles understood from the beginning: In the American system of government, all governments can legitimately exercise only powers delegated by applicable constitutions. When and if public servants exercise powers not delegated, they invariably do so for self-serving ends. The question in our system isn't what power government should have, but what has been delegated to it by the sovereign people.

American founders laid the foundation for our system of law and government in the Declaration of Independence when they justified severance from British rule by the "laws of Nature and Nature's God."

In other words, physical and moral law, otherwise known as natural law, is the fundamental law of the land both in the United States and the several States. If the intent wasn't articulated clearly enough by American Founders in the various discourses and addresses generated prior to the American Revolution, the "Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government", constructed the same years as the Constitution and adopted by Congress after the Constitution was established as the governing instrument for the United States, set the matter in stone. This intent was manifestly demonstrated in the Organic Act for Oklahoma Territory, in § 9 vesting territorial courts with competence in chancery (equity) and common law, and § 11, which authorized common law as framed in Nebraska statutes. The first session of the Oklahoma Legislature affirmed the common law, and today Oklahoma Statutes which preserve common law generally reference the 1910 edition of Oklahoma statutes, the first published by the State following territorial days, as the point of demarcation.

To date, there has not been a grant of any other form of law in the Oklahoma republic. At Article VII § 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction coextensive with borders of the State "at law and in equity," and the State constitution nowhere authorizes any other form of law - "at law" presumes the common law indigenous to Oklahoma from territorial days. This is the case for forty-nine of the fifty State republics, Louisiana being the exception (as a French colony, Louisiana retained French Civil Law as State fundamental law).

It is useful to consider the U.S. Constitution at Article III § 2 to understand the type and application of law within the several States (reproduced from Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition):

Article III
These provisions with respect to the States were to a certain extent modified by the Eleventh Amendment, adopted in 1798, but Article III provisions concerning United States judicial authority is otherwise pretty well the same as in the beginning. The Supreme Court has concluded that there are three case categories in the above provisions: Other than judicial authority pertaining to the geographical United States (District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc.), cases at law (common law) or in equity may be construed as in the scope of the "arising under" clause, under admiralty and maritime provisions, or relating to ambassadors, consuls, etc. Admiralty and maritime matters relate to international contracts, the law of nations, and affairs at sea, they are not within the scope of the "arising under" clause (see analysis pertaining to the "arising under" clause in the United States Code Service, and under "Admiralty", American Jurisprudence, 2d).

In the Judicial Act of 1789, Congress carried out constitutional intent by vesting courts of the United States with original cognizance in admiralty exclusive of the several States, and further protected interests of the American people by incorporating the saving to suitors clause which permits parties to suits to remove to common law when the common law is competent to provide a remedy. More or less the same exclusive provisions are retained in the Judicial Act of 1911, which is the present source law for United States courts, particularly district courts.

When Oklahoma and other States admitted to the Union since the Civil War were yet Territories, territorial courts had distinct territorial and federal characters (see Robinson v. Peru Plow & Wheel Co., 1 Okl. 140, 31 P. 988 (1893) and similar cases) as the Territories were under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction and therefore were subject to United States judicial authority. However, once the Territories were admitted to the Union as States, State courts could no longer retain a federal character. Aside from Tenth Amendment and Separation of Powers Doctrine limitations of the U.S. Constitution, the prohibition is made clear in the Oklahoma Constitution at Article II § 12:

The provision above, along with Article IV § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution, cover both ends of the Separation of Powers Doctrine as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. United States, et al, supra. Article IV articulates the Separation of Powers which preserves the republican form of government assured by the national constitution: These provisions must be maintained in order to preserve the substance and integrity of constitutional government. However, just as Congress has authority to establish special courts under Article I, the Oklahoma Legislature has authority to establish administrative courts for special purposes relating to government operation, regulation of subject classes such as corporations, and administration of State properties. This authority is prescribed at Article VII § 1, and where the district courts are concerned, articulated at Article VII § 7: Judicial sections of the Oklahoma Constitution were amended in 1967 and 1968 to accommodate various illicit measures in elections which were held at odd times. This has generally been the case for the several States in the last three to four decades, as tacitly acknowledged in the 1992 Maine Bar Association centennial report. However, consolidation of the State's courts, and districting in particular, does not stretch available law beyond that which is prescribed and permitted by United States and State constitutions. Courts of the United States retain original cognizance where admiralty and maritime law are concerned, and there is no grant of authority for the several States to impose admiralty or maritime law - particularly there is no grant to impose Civil Law. This is where legislative authority for district courts to review administrative action is relevant - "special" jurisdiction of the district court extends only to administrative matters relating to subject classes, not to the population at large.

There is seemingly a conflict in the Oklahoma Constitution which was created by adoption of Article VII. This is clearly seen by comparing jury trial provisions at Article II § 19, the Oklahoma Bill of Rights (also perverted to some extent in 1968/69), and the provision for jury trial verdicts at Article VII § 15:

Contrast Article VII § 15 with jury instructions given by Chief Justice John Jay to the jury in the first jury trial held in the United States Supreme Court (State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dal. 1: "… it is presumed that juries are the best judges of fact; it is, on the other hand, presumed that the courts are the best judges of law. But still both objects are within your power of decision..."

The common law, dating from signing of the Magna Charta in 1215 as the first foundation document (see particularly, Magna Charta §§ 7, 38, 39 & 40), determines that a jury of peers, and in the case of criminal indictment, a grand jury, is vested with authority both in law and fact. This applies as much to civil as criminal matters, and parties to any given action cognizable in common law are entitled to present matters of law and fact to the jury, whether a grand jury or trial jury. These common law principles are preserved in Article III § 2.3 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article II §§ 2, 6, 7, 15, 17, 19 and other provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. Article VII § 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution appears to contradict traditional jury authority, but when it is understood that special findings apply only to special matters such as administrative determinations relating to subject classes, the dilemma is easily resolved. In all cases, the appearance of conflict must favor the people, yielding to substantial rights secured by State and national constitutions.

The Oklahoma Constitution establishes the order of power and authority as follows:

The people of Oklahoma are sovereign, and government agencies, via public servants such as judicial officers, may exercise only those powers delegated. They cannot exceed powers specifically articulated, and as demonstrated above, officers of the State cannot function in a federal capacity. If district courts are going to function as administrative law courts then they do not have jurisdiction over the sovereign people except as people function in some special capacity subject to administrative law - officers of corporations, officers of State agencies, etc.

State district courts cannot operate under admiralty rules to impose Civil Law except where administrative law reaches subject classes. In other words, when operating as a statutory or legislative court, the district court is incompetent at law, meaning the common law which is premised on "the laws of Nature and Nature's God," proven over something in excess of eight hundred years of British-American experience. In the administrative law court, the judicial officer, rather than being a judge of the independent judicial branch of government, as required at Article IV § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution, functions as a legislative or administrative magistrate, and he in effect imposes bills of attainder, prohibited at Article II § 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution and corresponding provisions of the United States Constitution, any time he deprives the sovereign people of life, liberty or property. The magistrate carries out legislative and/or administrative functions as opposed to independent judicial functions, and in this framework, the court operates under principles of procedural rather than substantial due process, elevating government interest over that of the sovereign people.

A second aspect of the court when operating in statutory rather than common law capacity is that of a nisi prius or contract court which accommodates private international law (see "statutes" under subcategory "conflict of law" in Am.Jur. 2d.). This is admiralty where the administrative law court is vice-admiralty. The sovereign people of Oklahoma aren't subject to either.

Presumption of Federal Character Under Uniform Laws

What the United States Supreme Court occasionally refers to as "Cooperative Federalism" has evolved since approximately the Civil War. The history won't be covered in detail here as it is treated in memorandums addressing jurisdiction of United States district courts and related matters.

Where the several States are concerned, they were increasingly drawn under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction in the geographical United States during Reconstruction, the Monroe Doctrine playing an important role, with the period following establishment of the Federal Reserve System (1913) being particularly significant. From the time of the Julliard decision in 1884 through 1913, Americans were conditioned to accept and use United States paper money, which was backed by gold, then in the period from 1913 to 1933, Federal Reserve Notes were debauched to the point they were backed only by 40% gold with the other 60% backed by United States obligations (debt). Dilution of the monetary system gave America the first inflation in a hundred years, and contributed significantly to unsustainable speculation which resulted in the 1929 equities crash and ten years of hard depression.

Two days after taking office, Franklin Roosevelt declared a banking emergency and scheduled a special session of Congress, held March 9, 1933. Via H.R. 1491, Congress authorized scrip currency known as "Federal Reserve bank notes" backed exclusively by United States obligations (debt), gave preliminary approval for Roosevelt to seize privately held gold, and effectively turned the United States Government into an executive dictatorship. The subject has been treated extensively by Dr. Eugene Schroeder of Campo, Colorado and various others.

Beginning in late spring 1933, State legislatures were convened in special session or States were simply put under emergencies declared by governors (the North Dakota Legislature, which did not meet in 1933, was not called into special session). In Oklahoma, a special session of the Legislature commenced in May and ran into July 1933. New Deal banking, industrial, and agricultural stabilization and recovery acts fueled fires at both state and national levels as government was reorganized to operate outside constitutional bounds. The common thread was declaration of economic emergency - exercise of power which is nowhere authorized in State or United States constitutions.

For the first few years after the Roosevelt takeover, the United States Supreme Court attempted to hold the line by declaring much of the New Deal legislation unconstitutional. However, by 1938, Roosevelt made two appointments to the Court and threatened to expand the number of justices sufficiently to secure a majority who favored his political philosophy. The court capitulated via Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938) by proclaiming that there is no national or general common law. The Erie Railroad case opened flood gates - in the next several years, both State and United States courts closed the door on common law by moving under procedural due process provisions of Code law. This was in the wind for many years, as evidenced by the Maine Bar Association 1992 centennial report, with California and New York having promulgated early Civil Law provisions as early as 1872, but change prior to 1938 was relatively mild compared to that which was implemented from 1938 to approximately 1970, with a few States, such as North Dakota, delaying revision of constitutional provisions relating to courts until the early part of the current decade.

Through the 1930s, the unconstitutional arrangement between the several States and the geographical United States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction was referred to as "corporatism" - the United States Government is a corporate entity (1871), bankrupt and effectively put in receivership with the Federal Reserve as trustee (fiscal agent) in 1933. The several States signed on in order to receive benefit of allocations distributed by way of federal grants (the director of the U.S. Department of Transportation serves as leading authority over the federal grant-making process).

This arrangement, now known as Cooperative Federalism, works in somewhat the fashion a pregnant woman feeds her unborn baby: While the expectant mother's blood carries oxygen and nutrition to the unborn baby, and vacates waste, the mother's blood and the baby's blood never mix. They maintain the integrity of independent systems.

The Buck Act, implemented in 1940, which contains statutes promulgated by "Act of Congress" from as early as 1933, is the federal-side centerpiece. Although not all are formally in the Buck Act, statutes included in 4 USC §§ 101-117 all play a role. By referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, supra, it is evident that there are no implementing regulations applicable to the several States and the population at large for any of the statutes in title 4 of the United States Code.

The State side of the scam is carried out through Uniform Laws also known as "adopted acts." These Acts presume the several States are federal States subject to Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction rather than solely to Article I delegated authorities. This matter was treated earlier by referencing statute authority for the Federal Reserve Act and the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 - there are no implementing regulations applicable to the several States and the population at large for any of these Acts.

One of the more serious concerns for researchers focused on the emergency declared March 9, 1933 was incorporation of Section 5b of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended. By removing two exclusionary clauses, the provision appears to change application so Government emergency powers reach the several States. The amendments, drafted by the New York Federal Reserve Bank board of directors, eliminated two phrases which exempted control of trade and exchange, particularly in gold, in the several States. Subsequent to passage, banks and the Government seized privately held gold, with Roosevelt later converting the seized gold at a higher price than paid to the people. However, implementing regulations demonstrate that this provision, today codified at 12 USC § 95a, is under Customs authority and is applicable only outside the several States. In other words, there is documented proof the scam was engaged without constitutional authority and the Act, whether constitutional or not, was applicable only in the geographical United States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction and as might be applicable to foreign entities. This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of regulations extending authority of Congress' retroactive approval of Roosevelt's emergency proclamation (12 USC § 95b).

Federally chartered financial institutions, inclusive of national banking "associations" established to provide financial services for officers, agents and employees of the United States, serve in the intermediate role for transfer in the capacity of federal tax and loan depositaries (31 CFR §§ 202 et seq.).

These entities, whether national banks, converted State banks (banks of the several States cannot legitimately participate in the Federal Reserve scam), federal savings and loan associations, federal credit unions, Farm Credit System banks, FHA, FmHA, or whatever else, traffic in only three mediums: Funds generated via fractional reserve banking that monetize private assets by way of Federal Reserve "book entry" credit (see 1 CFR § 462, "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Book-Entry Regulations)" as example), the Federal Reserve [bank] Note, backed by obligations of the United States, and "Public Money", (31 CFR, Chapter 10).

These three mediums deserve individual attention:

First, the Federal Reserve [bank] Note, authorized at 4 USC §§ 411 & 412, has never been supported by regulations applicable to the several States (verify by reference to the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, supra). Further, the Federal Reserve [bank] Note is questionable for any other application. Since March 3, 1971, the Internal Revenue Service hasn't been authorized to accept Federal Reserve [bank] Notes and other such instruments in payment of assessed taxes (see repeal of 26 USC § 6312, March 3, 1971, via Public Law 92-5, § 4(a)(2)). In other words, the Federal Reserve [bank] Note has about the same legitimacy in the several States as Confederate money, Monopoly money or clam shells - it has only perceived, no intrinsic or inherent value.

Next is the matter of bank credit issued against private assets which are fractionalized via Federal Reserve book-entry credit. Authority for this scheme was at 12 USC § 101, and there were never regulations applicable to the several States, but today this fraud is further compounded by the fact that §§ 101 et seq. were repealed in 1994. In other words, even the illusion of authority no longer exists - federally chartered financial institutions today monetize American assets without so much as a semblance of legal authority.

Public money is defined in regulations at 31 CFR § 202.1:

Further insight is provided at 31 CFR § 209.1, relating to payment to financial institutions for credit to accounts of federal employees and beneficiaries: To reiterate, there is no regulation published in the Federal Register making any of these three mediums "for payment of debt" applicable within the several States. The Federal Reserve [bank] Note is merely private-issue scrip that is not supported by regulation applicable to the several States, and is so far out of favor that it has not been accepted for payment of internal revenue taxes since March 3, 1971. There has never been implementing regulations authorizing fractional reserve banking in the several States, and statutory authority applicable in the geographical United States was even repealed in 1994. Finally, "public money" is merely an arrangement whereby the United States Government transfers credit (debt obligations) to its officers, agents and employees. There is no authority for the several States or the population at large to participate in this scheme perpetrated via federally chartered financial institutions.

One example of the State of Oklahoma presuming the character of a federal State rather than maintaining status as one of the several States is contained in legislation relating to judgments denominated in foreign money. Note that the definition of "State" in this section lists states of the United States, naming the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, but fails to name any of the several States. The definition corresponds to those in Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Buck Act (unless otherwise stipulated, sections from Oklahoma Statutes were downloaded in September 1995 from the BBS maintained by the State of Oklahoma):

The Uniform Commercial Code provides a similar definition of "money" as those set out above at 12A O.S. § 1-201(24): As previously noted, the U.S. Constitution, at Article I § 10, prohibits the several States from making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. These Acts stand in clear contradiction to the constitutional prohibition, so must be premised on something other than State and United States constitutional authority. This is seen in the definition of "State", naming the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico to identify the class of federal States, without identifying any of the several States, thus deviously stripping Oklahoma of its status as a State republic subject only to Congress' Article I legislative jurisdiction. It will also be noted that particulars in statutes set out above tacitly distinguish between money of the United States of America, and United States dollars - as already demonstrated, United States "dollars" are as foreign to the several States as the Japanese Yen or the Swiss Mark.

A variation of the federal State definition appears in title 22, the Oklahoma Code of Criminal Procedure:

Another variation of the definition is located in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. This particular Act is important as it falls directly under Buck Act authority, the original Act of Congress implemented in 1933, and even then applicable only in the federal States exclusive of the several States:
Article II
The Oklahoma Code of Civil Procedure, as the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Traffic Code, Uniform Commercial Code, and many other Acts published as Oklahoma Statutes are among the uniform laws adopted by the several States, with all of these laws presuming the federal character, as demonstrated above. Most are identified by statute such as the following: These various uniform acts are defined in Oklahoma statutes as being "adopted acts", and are distinguished from foundation law at 75 O.S. § 11: Along with the other States which adopted English-American common law, Oklahoma recognizes the Magna Charta as the first significant document establishing common rights and remedies, and as the Preamble to the Oklahoma Constitution clearly demonstrates, the people of Oklahoma responsible for establishing the State constitution recognized "Almighty God" as being the fountain and source of authority and liberty. Documents recognized as being elements of Oklahoma law are listed as follows: Finally, existing rights and remedies, meaning those of a substantive or substantial nature (an inherent or unalienable right or remedy has substance) are preserved in the savings statute: An existing right or remedy is antecedent to, or comes before that which is done later. In the Declaration of Independence, American founders appealed to the "laws of Nature and Nature's God" to justify severance from British rule. They then proclaimed that all men are created equal, endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable or inherent rights. Only then was government mentioned as an entity to be established among men for the purpose of securing unalienable rights, thereby providing an environment in which those rights might be enjoyed.

God, not government, endows man with basic dignities, and man thereafter creates government with certain enumerated responsibilities, delegating only those powers specified.

The right is antecedent to the remedy - those who have no rights have no remedies. In the American system, those vested with unalienable rights enjoy the status of sovereign just as the English king was sovereign prior to the American Revolution. The American sovereign is no more subject to incidental law created by government than the English king was. Government can impose such authority only on subject classes. The sovereign can be indicted and otherwise put upon only by peers, with his peers having authority over law and fact in both the indictment and prosecution process.

"Existing rights and remedies" were first set to paper as a fundamental document in the Magna Charta after English barons subdued King John for domestic tyranny. The Popular Rebellion of 1640, due largely and primarily to Star-Chamber and convoluted ecclesiastical courts, ended the tyranny of Charles I. And the American Revolution was fought largely because of vice-admiralty courts imposed by George III. These three historic events, along with numerous less significant clashes, proved the necessity of substantial due process.

Throughout American colonial and early national development, the Bible was the primary handbook of common law, and at least through the last century, courts acknowledged that Christian principles are an integral part of the English-American common law, viewed in the framework of state and national constitutions and general laws of the several States.

The notion that the people are self-governing and government is self-regulating is a foundation principle in the American system. This is visibly demonstrated through an English concept of law: People indigenous to the land are subject only to the law of the land, meaning the heritage common law, while the king exercises admiralty rule at sea. The king's authority via admiralty rule spreads inland only in the event of national peril which threatens survival. This is described as the "high water mark" - the rule of necessity prevails. Natural and human resources, production, distribution and all other national assets may then be organized to support survival need. Then, and only then, can the people be subjected to admiralty authority. During the emergency, procedural due process may for a time displace substantive due process.

This is precisely what happened in 1933: On March 6, two days after he was inaugurated, President Roosevelt declared an emergency, and under the rule of necessity, ordered the bank holiday (closed federally chartered banks; State banks for the most part followed suit), and called the special session of Congress for March 9.

Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover presidential papers demonstrate that the New York Federal Reserve Bank board of directors first submitted the suggested emergency proclamation to Hoover, but Hoover refused to endorse the order as he believed it was unconstitutional. The Congressional Record for March 9, 1933 discloses that concerned House members wanted to know the source of H.R. 1491, the banking relief act which was read in emergency session without printed copies being distributed. Comments in Roosevelt's presidential papers reflecting his concerns demonstrate that even the President didn't know particulars of H.R. 1491 as he believed it would be necessary to issue warehouse receipts or some other scrip to serve as interim currency. He was not aware of the Federal Reserve [bank] Note, backed exclusively by obligations of the United States, or how it would operate.

Governors of the several States declared emergencies subsequent to Roosevelt declaring what today is known to have been an exclusively United States emergency, the geographical United States being only that subject to Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction (District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc.). There are no state or national constitutional provisions which authorize proclamation of emergencies except in the event of invasion, war, or civil uprising, with all such provisions having limited duration (Congress must renew appropriations for military enterprise every two years).

Hoover later charged that bank runs supposedly justifying the Roosevelt emergency were initiated by New Deal insiders who withdrew massive amounts of gold and shipped it abroad, eventually enjoying windfall profits when Roosevelt established an elevated price.

The March 9 House Record reflects that bank officers were largely responsible for industry woes as they engaged in the speculative period leading to the depression by leveraging assets to the point that collectively they had $44 on loan for every dollar on deposit. Since the federally chartered banking system, attached to the Federal Reserve System, was simply a United States intergovernmental system devised to provide financial services to agencies of the United States and officers, agents and employees of those agencies (departments), the illusion had to be accommodated on the State side by corresponding fraud. This has been accomplished via uniform adopted acts (1) accommodating private international law, and/or (2) administrative law applicable only to subject classes such as government agencies and corporations.

The character of State courts in the framework of various uniform laws is disclosed in the Oklahoma Code of Criminal Procedure via the designation of State judges at all levels as "magistrates" -

To date, the underlying character of State magistrate judges (Special Judges) has not been traced, but Federal Magistrate Judges are national park commissioners (28 USCS § 631-639) who have concurrent jurisdiction with U.S. district courts where they are assigned (18 USCS §§ 7(3) & 3231; in the several States, jurisdiction is limited to forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings ceded to the United States for constitutional purposes). When serving in magistrate capacity, the State judicial officer is operating in somewhat the same role as an Article I judge of the United States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction to impose administrative law (admiralty/vice-admiralty). Administrative due process is procedural, not substantive or substantial, with the court reserving authority to determine law while submitting only matters of fact for jury determination: In the admiralty or vice-admiralty court, the magistrate commands law, as well as evidence, so whether by direct or indirect means, has the power to secure what amounts to directed verdicts, whether by a jury or the Court. This is further demonstrated by the following provision in the Oklahoma Code of Civil Procedure: The nature of uniform laws is disclosed in the very beginning of the Oklahoma Code of Civil Procedure: The term "derogation" is defined in the Sixth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary as follows: That which is in derogation of something does not abrogate it, but in some way encumbers or limits application. In a December 1994 letter, Justice Marian P. Opala of the Oklahoma Supreme Court described operation of legislative or statutory State courts as "non-constitutional." In other words, they operate outside constitutional bounds, and as statutes cited above demonstrate, the magistrate judge is obliged to take judicial notice of constitutional and common law when introduced by a party to an action, but he reserves the right to determine relevance and application of fundamental law when and if a case is submitted for jury consideration - the "special jury" authorized at Article VII § 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Operation of original and adopted acts is somewhat on the order of Yin and Yang in the Chinese infinity circle: Black and white together fill all available space but do not share space. Black is passive, white is active. When light penetrates, darkness flees. Thus, the rule governing "conflict of law" at 75 O.S. § 12: Procedural due process cannot deprive the de jure people of substantial rights, as secured by State and national constitutions, whether in civil or criminal actions.

Adopted uniform acts do not abrogate fundamental law; man cannot author or amend the laws of Nature and Nature's God, and for that which stands contrary to historically proven rights and remedies to prevail would be to abandon even the semblance of constitutional rule. It is one thing to beguile, but another to oppress when the truth is known and is presented to the Court.

Political Takeover; Preservation of Common Law Remedies

In 1933, brave souls in Oklahoma, Colorado and several other State legislatures issued resolutions demanding that Congress supply the States with constitutionally legitimate gold and silver coin. The initiatives were ignored, and the legislatures went on to accommodate the absurd. In 1933, Oklahoma and other State legislatures enacted legislation proclaiming that virtually all activity is commercial in nature. This has been the vehicle for general fraud perpetrated under the guise of "Cooperative Federalism" for something in excess of six decades. Supposedly, Congress' authority spreads inland under the constitutional commerce clause. However, the United States Code defines "interstate commerce" as commercial activity between the federal States and, as identified in the Uniform Commercial Code via definition previously cited, international affairs. United States administrative agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do not have implementing regulations applicable to the several States. But governments of the several States clamor to accommodate sweeping fraud that undermines national sovereignty and solvency, thereby visiting destruction on national resource industries and exporting American manufacturing.

By 1990, United States Government employed more people than all American manufacturing combined. In Oklahoma and other interior States, government has been the only consistent growth industry since approximately 1981. The effect will be cataclysmic: The nation's combined public and private debt long ago crossed the $25 trillion mark, with no way to service "book-entry" credit (blue-sky "debt", being the obligation of the issuing entity) from gross domestic product that languishes below $6 trillion.

The Congressional Record for the House on March 9, 1933 contains an acknowledgment of import - Representatives responsible for promoting H.R. 1491 were fully aware the bill would institutionalize inflation. By the end of the decade, Karl Wilkins and other analysts projected the approximate timeframe when compounding interest would threaten the nation with general economic meltdown. The first Grace Commission Report, released in August 1980, accurately forecast debt spiral acceleration after 1985.

Economy is based on physical law - "the laws of Nature and Nature's God" - and there is no way to avoid adverse consequence when departing underlying principles such as, "Nothing comes from nothing."

Common law is rooted in historically proven truth, such as physical law governing economy, recognizing that truth ultimately prevails, whether as benefit or consequence, and in the American common law lineage, where the people are sovereign, the people reserve the right to judge law and fact, whether in political or judicial forums. One avenue is as important as the other - jury powers in particular safeguard against tyranny under color of law. The matter was addressed by the Honorable Theo. Parsons in the Massachusetts convention in 1788 when answering the objection that the proposed Constitution for the United States did not contain a Bill of Rights. Parsons recited a principle of English-American common law lineage:

The People themselves have it in their power effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms. An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a criminal by the general government, yet only his fellow citizens can convict him; they're his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce him if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation. (2 Elliot's Debates, 94, Bancroft, History of the Constitution, p. 267)

As demonstrated, the admiralty/administrative law court operating in the context of Code law seeks to frustrate and remove the common law authority of juries, and by procedural, as opposed to substantive due process, perpetuate the absurd. However, in order for procedural/code law to remain non-constitutional, as opposed to unconstitutional, procedural due process must provide avenues to secure substantial rights. This is done variously in titles of the United States Code and codes of the several States.

Oklahoma is fortunate to have an excellent constitution which in many ways condemns procedural due process where State agencies such as courts assume a federal character and accommodate the absurd. Provisions below provide one of several avenues for condemning fraud on the part of various federally chartered financial institutions.

At Article I § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the Constitution of the United States is recognized as the supreme law of the land. This is consistent with provision made in the Constitution for the United States - it must be incorporated as the law of the land in the several States. Therefore, the prohibition against making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt at Article I § 10.1 of the national constitution is the law of the land in Oklahoma and other States party to the constitution. At Article II § 15, the Oklahoma Constitution articulates other provisions found in Article I § 10 of the national constitution, specifically stipulating that the State cannot pass law which impairs the obligation of contracts.

Theoretically, the right to contract might permit the outrageous and thereby legitimize "non-constitutional" Code law. However, the United States Supreme Court has time and again ruled that anyone who enters a contract which infringes on constitutionally assured rights must be informed and knowingly endorse such contracts. The Oklahoma Constitution takes this a step further in Article XXIII §§ 8 & 9:

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
In Oklahoma, contracts that do not comply with provisions of the Constitution for the United States, and with historical principles of common law, do not exist. They are nullities, and are therefore unenforceable, from the beginning - they are nunc pro tunc, as though they never were.

As the self-interested United States emerged, Congress implemented measures to bind loyalty under Article IV authority. This was accomplished by way of a two-oath system. Many elected and appointed officers of the United States first take the constitutional oath prescribed by the national constitution, then a second oath to the geographical United States prescribed by separate statute. The second oath for United States justices and judges is located at 28 USC § 453.

Many of the several States, including Oklahoma, have adopted this same mechanism. The official constitutional oath to state and national constitutions is located at Article XV § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Elected and appointed State and local officials then take a statutory oath described as a "Loyalty Oath" that accommodates constitutions and laws. This second oath, while appearing relatively innocent, accommodates de facto (unlawful) operation of the State as a federal State rather than one of the several States.

Technically, any official who takes the second oath and is aware that it accommodates the federal character of State and local government has abridged the prohibition against simultaneously serving in state and federal capacities (Article II § 12 of the Oklahoma Constitution), and could be immediately removed under penalties of perjury, prescribed at Article XV § 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

The principle is scriptural: No man can serve two masters. It's one thing to innocently serve in a de facto capacity contrary to fundamental law, but quite another to knowingly accommodate tyranny.

With this overview, we can move into Code law itself to see how constitutional and common law are preserved. The following should be framed in the context of 12 O.S. § 2, that speaks to the Code of Civil Procedure being in "derogation" of the common law, 75 O.S. § 11, which distinguishes between original acts (Magna Charta, Declaration of Independence, etc., through the constitutions and English-American lineage common law) and adopted acts, 75 O.S. § 12, which under conflict of laws doctrine stipulates that original acts will in all cases prevail, and 75 O.S. § 178, which preserves all "existing rights and remedies."

Substantial due process and common law governing conduct of various State and county officers is preserved in Oklahoma Statutes, but is hidden well enough that it is difficult to find. The common law action is preserved as follows:

The county court clerk is required to comply with statutory and common law, with 12 O.S. § 12 governing conduct: The county sheriff is under the same obligation: Unfortunately, there is no docket provision that presently accommodates common law actions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has authority to add common law to the docket, but State courts will not have a common law capacity to the point the docket is expanded. Both civil and criminal dockets, as well as small claims, accommodate statutory Civil Law which presumes the federal character and operates under admiralty rules. In all cases, this law applies to subject classes, whether in the administrative or private international law framework. This is demonstrated by definitions of the term "person" in both the Code of Civil Procedure and the Uniform Commercial Code: Natural-born, moral people are principals, they are not subjects. The definitions above define "person" as an individual on the same level as humanly created entities such as private corporations, government entities, etc. In other words, all are subject classes, including the "individual."

This is another tie to the "federal State" as opposed to the de jure State republic. The term "individual" is defined as "a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." (5 USC § 552(a)(2)). This "citizen of the United States" is tied to the geographical United States via Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States, as follows:

Amendment XIV [1868]
The de jure people of the several States, who are not citizens of the geographical United States, are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof [the United States]" except as prescribed in Article I of the Constitution. But the matter can be narrowed even further - the Fourteenth Amendment was never properly ratified, as concluded by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Legislature, and acknowledged in the Congressional Record in the 1940s. The link between federally chartered financial institutions and "persons" is shored up in the Uniform Commercial Code: As already demonstrated via 44 USC § 1505(a), 31 CFR § 202 et seq. (§ 209.1 in particular), FDIC definitions, and various other statutory and regulatory authorities, federally chartered financial institutions are established to accommodate agencies of the United States, agencies of federal States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction, and officers, agents and employees of those agencies. The fiat credit and monetary systems were not established to serve the several States and the population at large, as evidenced by the lack of implementing regulations for the Federal Reserve Act and the Banking Acts of 1933 & 1935. Therefore, the term "person", which includes "individual" on a par with corporations, government agencies, etc., must be (1) the Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the United States, "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," (2) people who serve in public office subject to Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction, and/or (3) someone who isn't a Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the United States but happens to live or be in the geographical United States (District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc., or on a federal enclave ceded to the United States for constitutional purpose). In any case, the several States and Citizens of the several States are not subject to admiralty/vice-admiralty authority of legislative courts, whether of the States or the United States.

If a natural person, meaning a member of the sovereign people, is intended to be subject to any given Adopted Act statute, the statute or an implementing rule or regulation must specifically articulate that intent. Each of the several States has an administrative procedures act comparable to the Federal Administrative Procedures Act (5 USC § 552 et seq.), and the same general rules apply: If implementing rules or regulations are not published in the State equivalent to the Federal Register, application of any given statute is limited to government agencies and employees. The Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act is at 75 O.S. § 250.1 et seq.

Without an implementing rule or regulation which has been published in the State Register, Code statutes are not sustainable in civil or criminal actions. Further, all courts which operate in derogation of common law, in the character of Article I courts of the United States, are courts of limited jurisdiction - when jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven on the record. And as several statutes already cited demonstrate, statutory law can never abridge substantial rights.

Codes of civil and criminal procedure provide protection under rules governing judicial notice and presumed fact. When pleadings introduce matters of constitutional and common law, the magistrate is required to take judicial notice - the mandate is not optional. Under rules governing presumed fact, the opposing party has the opportunity to rebut, but if he doesn't overcome legal authorities which reflect elements and principles of constitutional and common law, the cause cannot be sustained. The rule governing conflict of law (12 O.S. § 12) in all cases preserves existing rights and remedies (75. O.S. § 178) in the face of adopted acts. Key governing statutes for judicial notice and presumed fact are as follows:

When pleadings under provisions of 12 O.S. § 2012 challenge jurisdiction over person or subject matter, venue, etc., the Court is governed by Rule 4 of the District Court rules (1989 edition, Oklahoma Court Rules and Procedure, State and Federal, West Publishing Co., pp. 556 & 557):
RULE 4. MOTIONS
Rule 4(h) is important in this context as once venue and jurisdiction are challenged, the Court is immobilized and cannot command appearance or anything else to the point these preliminary matters are resolved with concrete evidence of legitimate authority. It isn't sufficient for a Magistrate to claim, "Yeah, I noticed that, now let's get on with the trial."

If a court doesn't have jurisdiction or venue authority, the party who has not been properly joined has no more concern for what happens in the court than what happens at the Grand Order of Moose, unless he happens to be a Moose member. In other words, it makes no difference if a party is present or not, a court cannot unilaterally act without proof of authority in record. If and when it does, the magistrate sheds his cloak of judicial immunity - unless or until he can prove authority, he acts at his own peril.

One of the underlying facts concerning the legislative/statutory court is that it does not have res judicata authority - all actions may be raised again on matters of both fact and law.

This matter was indirectly addressed in Wortham v. Walker, 128 S.W.2d 1138: No act of de facto government is ever of binding consequence. This is particularly relevant where State officers have abandoned the proper constitutional role of the State as an independent republic subject only to Congress' Article I legislative jurisdiction - there is no provision either in State or United States constitutions authorizing State or United States officials to acquiesce sovereignty of the State and Citizens of the State.

This message was eloquently articulated by justices of the United States Supreme Court in New York v. United States, et al (1992), supra: The Tenth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Doctrine prohibit Congress from exercising power not delegated, and simultaneously prevent officers of the several States from accommodating federal powers not delegated before securing constitutional amendments.

In the context of the Oklahoma Constitution, if and when the legislative/statutory court deprives any of the sovereign people of life, liberty or property by way of procedural due process, it has done so without substantial due process, as contemplated at Article II § 7, and it has effected a bill of attainder, prohibited by the United States Constitution at Article I § 10 and the Oklahoma Constitution at Article II § 15. The magistrate, being a legislative rather than a true judicial officer, has abridged the Separation of Powers Doctrine, preserved at Article IV § 1; when acting in a federal capacity, has transgressed the constitutional prohibition against serving in State and United States capacities simultaneously (Okla. Constitution, Article II § 12); and is subject to penalties of perjury prescribed in the Oklahoma Constitution at Article XV § 2. He is also subject to removal under Article VII-A § 1(b) and other provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Admiralty/Civil Law v. Common Law

The 1914 edition of Corpus Juris provides a decent background and history of Admiralty and Civil Law under "Admiralty" (p. 1248 et seq.):
I. DEFINITION
II. ORIGIN AND GROWTH
III. COURTS OF ADMIRALTY
IV. JURISDICTION
The closely entwined history of Admiralty and Civil Law, with few distinctions between the two, demonstrates the private nature of admiralty. Merchants rather than civil governments established admiralty courts, and in many cases, extended authority into maritime communities and nations. This "law of the sea," premised on contract liabilities and conditions where ship owners and masters were quite literally private dictators, was severe beyond endurance so far as English-speaking peoples in the British Isles were concerned. English Barons took King John I to task because of what amounted to inland admiralty rule; the Popular Rebellion of 1640 was due to the Star-Chamber (admiralty) and severe ecclesiastical courts under Charles I; and the American Revolution was largely in response to vice-admiralty courts of George III. Admiralty and vice-admiralty courts cater to the self-serving ends of entrenched powers without consideration for fundamental law or the rights of those subjected to admiralty rule.

American Founders considered this form of law repugnant, and because of grievances, limited admiralty jurisdiction to spheres of commercial activity where the laws and customs of the sea prevailed. It wasn't until after the Civil War that Congress spread admiralty law and rule to Territories that were yet to be admitted to states, and vested Territorial courts with the Admiralty/Civil Law character.

The history above demonstrates that both the United States Constitution and, in the beginning, Congress, intended to reserve admiralty jurisdiction exclusively to the United States, and thereby prohibit admiralty authority in courts of the several States. This was first accomplished in the judicial act of 1789, and subsequently in 1911, with the latter establishing United States district courts as having original and exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty affairs (18 USC § 3231), except where Territorial courts were granted concurrent jurisdiction (18 USC § 3241).

Courts of the several States cannot legitimately operate in Admiralty (Oklahoma Constitution does not mention and therefore does not authorize admiralty or Civil Law), as the British-American lineage common law is the law of the land. The properly constituted jury, comprised of Citizens of the State, determine law and fact under rules of the common law.

Traditionally, the common law court, or court of common pleas, was not under government authority, particularly where civil matters were concerned. This was made clear in the Magna Charta at § 7: "Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be holden in some place certain."

After the Norman Invasion of 1066, William the Conqueror established an appellate system which ended at the King's bench, thus providing a forum which brought about uniformity in the English common law system, but the people were left to handle most affairs in local courts without government infringement.

When operating in admiralty capacity, as opposed to functions as administrative law, courts of both the States and the United States accommodate private international law (see "Statutes", subcategory "Conflict of Law", American Jurisprudence, 2d.), and thereby assume inland authority not constitutionally delegated. The common law prevails in the several States, as opposed to federal Territories also defined as States under Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction.

One of the visible affirmations of Admiralty courts, and operation of admiralty rule in general, are gold-fringed flags displayed in courtrooms and elsewhere in public buildings. Address of this matter has gotten to the point of being comical: The official flag of the United States, prescribed at 4 USC § 1, does not have gold fringe. Likewise, official flags of the several States, save North Dakota, do not have gold fringe. Yet it is a subject judicial officers and other public officials refuse to address.

The situation is somewhat like a certain woman who caught her husband in bed with another woman. The man remained calm, pulled on his pants, then asked the wife, "Are you going to believe me or your lying eyes?"

In other words, public officials, particularly judicial officers, appear to have adopted policy embraced by Adolph Hitler: Never confess. Make the adversary prove tyranny, then continue to deny the truth even in the face of conspicuous facts.

Operation of State and United States courts under Admiralty rules provides judicial officers the opportunity to control, and many times suppress law and fact, thereby shielding the outrageous.

Admiralty accommodates captures on land and sea - it is the law of prize, legitimate only in times of war. The history and evolution of American inland admiralty rule dates to the Civil War, with the Monroe Doctrine adopted during Reconstruction providing an early framework for eventual domestic takeover by State and United States admiralty courts.

The common law, which is the law of the land in the several States, acknowledges and preserves the right of the people to ultimately and finally determine matters of law and fact. Admiralty accommodates the noblesse oblige by placing control of law and fact in the hands of judicial officers who cater to, and seemingly profit from, plunder of the very people they are pledged by oath to serve. This silent war against the people can hardly be described more accurately than to call it inland piracy.

The Oklahoma Code of Civil Procedure clearly gives away the character of the statutory court in the following statute:

Common law and equity are two distinct systems: Common law has both civil and criminal aspects, where equity is civil only, and parties must voluntarily participate. As demonstrated in the selection from Corpus Juris, Admiralty and Civil Law, which are for all practical purposes indistinguishable so far as procedure is concerned, have both civil and criminal characters. The Oklahoma Constitution does not authorize Admiralty or Civil Law, and the intent of the United States Constitution prohibits these forms of law in the several States.

Summary and Conclusion

Judicial officers of the United States and the several States have for years shielded the Internal Revenue Service, an agency Congress never created and has been proven to be a branch of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.

No taxing statute in the Internal Revenue Code reaches the several States - no implementing regulations extend authority to establish revenue districts in the several States; there are no regulations or delegations of authority granting authority of the Department of the Treasury [Puerto Rico], the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or any other Treasury personnel authority in the several States.

Federally chartered financial institutions are created under "Act of Congress" as "associations" to provide financial services to agencies of the United States and officers, agents and employees of the United States. They deal exclusively in (1) public money premised on obligations of the United States, (2) bank-created credit, (book-entry or ledger debt) which has no legitimate value, and (3) Federal Reserve [bank] Notes, none having legitimate value in the several States.

Operation of State courts must be considered against this backdrop of proven law and fact. Only then does the distinction between procedural vs. substantive or substantial due process begin to make sense to ordinary people who are befuddled by convoluted and hidden law and ritual magic which masquerades as due process.

Uniform laws known as adopted acts accommodate operation of state and local governments as "instrumentalities of the United States" (26 USC § 301(c)) subject to Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction rather than agencies of independent republics subject only to Congress' Article I delegated powers. The benefactors are obvious: The system of de facto government, particularly through State and United States courts, caters to and serves entrenched powers hostile to American sovereignty and solvency, intent on global conquest for self-serving ends. Those who knowingly accommodate this long-standing tyranny are quite literally in rebellion against man, nature and God - they disdain not only the roots of liberty, but condemn even their own posterity, thus fulfilling the scriptural maxim, "The sons shall inherit the sins of the fathers..."

It is the right and responsibility of the sovereign people to restore constitutional rule (Magna Charta; Declaration of Independence; Constitution for the United States of America, Amendments 1, 2 & 9; Oklahoma Constitution, Article II § 1, 3 & 33). The same principles endorsed by the United States and nations throughout the Free World via the Nuremberg trials following World War II apply:

By my signature, I attest that to the best of my knowledge and understanding, all matters of law and fact presented herein are accurate and true.
Dan Meador
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